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NOTES AND COMMENTS
under a deed purporting to convey the whole and entry and possession
under such foreclosure deed constitute color of title.16 No cases have
been found which determine the question of whether or not a void deed
of gift may be color of title.17
BENJAMIN S. MARKS, JR.
Railway Labor Act-Representation of Racial Minority Groups in
Bargaining and Contract Administration Without Discrimination
In Conley v. Gibson,' petitioners, Negro members of the Brother-
hood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, were segregated into a separate
local union. They brought a class action for themselves and other
Negro employees similarly situated against the union, claiming rights
arising under the Railway Labor Act.2 The union had been designated
as the exclusive bargaining representative under the act.
The collective bargaining agreement which had been negotiated by
the union with the company contained among other provisions a uniform
seniority clause; and a summary dismissal of an employee without
cause would be a breach of the collective bargaining agreement which
normally would be challenged by the union through the grievance pro-
cedure.
In substance petitioners alleged that they were discharged by the
railroad in violation of the seniority agreement, ostensibly on the ground
that their jobs were being abolished. They alleged that in reality their
jobs were not abolished, but that the vacancies were immediately filled
with white men with the exception of a few Negroes who were rehired
for their old jobs with a loss of seniority. The company explained that
after abolishing petitioners' jobs it found it necessary to "create" certain
new positions. Petitioners alleged that the union failed to protest their
discharge, protect their jobs, and process their grievances as they would
have those of white employees, all "according to plan."
reconveyed the land to the tenant in common and took a mortgage back in himself.
Thereafter the mortgage was foreclosed and the property bid in by defendant. He
transferred the land to a stranger who subsequently reconveyed it to him. The
tenant in common listed the land for taxes and remained in possession of the
land throughout. The cotenants instituted partition proceedings and defendant
claimed sole seisin, basing his claim of title upon seven years adverse possession
under color of title.
" Dew v. Garner, 207 Ala. 353, 92 So. 647 (1922) ; Bradshaw v. Holmes, 246
S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Schlarb v. Castaing, 50 Wash. 331, 97 Pac.
289 (1908). But cf. Bailey v. Howell, supra note 15.
'The court raised the question in Justice v. Mitchell, 238 N.C. 364, 78 S.E.2d
122 (1953), but did not answer it since under the facts if it were color of title
it would have been destroyed when claimant was made a cotenant under a will
devising the property.
'355 U.S. 41 (1957).
144 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1952).
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The union interposed several jurisdictional objections. The most
important of these was that the National Railroad Adjustment Board had
exclusive jurisdiction over the disputes.3 But the Court pointed out that
the portion of the Railway Labor Act defining the jurisdiction of the
Board, by its own terms, only gives it jurisdiction over "disputes be-
tween an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers. ' '4
Here, the dispute was between employees and their bargaining agent
and not between employee and employerY
The Railway Labor Act provides that within an appropriate unit
the majority of employees may select the exclusive bargaining agent,0
whose statutory duty it then becomes to represent all of the employees
in the class or craft.7
On the merits the Court held that if the facts as alleged were true,
this was a flagrant violation of the union's statutory duty to bargain
collectively in favor of petitioners and to represent them fairly and with-
out hostile discrimination. Collective bargaining does not end with the
making of an agreement with the employer; it is a continuing process
involving day to day adjustments in the contract and the protection of
employee rights already secured by the agreement. The Court there-
fore reversed the lower courts' dismissal of the complaint and remanded
the case for further proceedings in the district court.
The unanimous decision in the Conley case was the culmination of
a long line of decisions dealing with racial discrimination in collective
' Other jurisdictional questions were passed upon. The union contended that
the Texas and New Orleans Railroad was an indispensable party defendant. The
Court, however, pointed out that the suit was solely by a group of employees
against their statutory bargaining representative and only incidentally concerned
the carrier. No relief was asked against the railroad and there was little prospect
that any would be granted which would bind it.
'Railway Labor Act § 3 First (i), 48 STAT. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First
(i) (1952).
' Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act confers jurisdiction on the National
Railroad Adjustment Board to hold hearings, make findings, and enter awards in
all disputes between carriers and their employees "growing out of grievances or out
of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions . . . ." 48 STAT. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1952).
Where a dispute is between a carrier and its employees and does involve the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement the Court denies jurisdiction
to federal and state courts until the Board has interpreted the agreement, believing
that the Board is peculiarly familiar with the problems of interpreting a collective
bargaining agreement. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950);
Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946).
'Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, AFL, 300
U.S. 515 (1937).
'Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); cf. Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944). The minority of employees in the unit is not allowed
by the act to select a collective bargaining representative of its own. Virginian Ry.
v. System Federation, No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, AFL, supra note 6; Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944). Cf. J. I.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) ; Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 678 (1944); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
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bargaining, beginning with Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R.' In that case
the exclusive bargaining representative for the railway firemen working
on southeastern railroads negotiated several clauses in the collective
bargaining agreements with the railroads, against their initial opposition,
which would have had the ultimate effect of excluding Negro firemen
from the service. One of these clauses was that only "promotable"
employees should be employed as firemen or assigned to new runs or
permanent vacancies in established runs. Inasmuch as all railroads at
that time had a policy of not promoting Negroes to serve as engineers,
the provision affected, for the most part, only Negroes. The non-union
Negro firemen, thus discriminated against, brought a class action against
the union and the railroad alleging a breach of the duty imposed by
the Railway Labor Act.9
The Court's unanimous decision was that petitioners' complaint
stated facts which if proved would entitle them to the relief of a
declaratory judgment, damages, and an injunction against further dis-
crimination by the union on the basis of race. The union was held to
be under a duty to represent non-union members of the craft, at least
to the extent of not discriminating against them as such in making con-
tracts with the railroad.1 0 Concerning, the contract clauses the Court
said, "Here the discriminations based on race alone are obviously irrele-
vant and invidious. Congress plainly did not undertake to authorize
the bargaining representative to make such discriminations.""
To grasp the real significance of the holding in the Conley case it is
important to notice two differences between it and the Steele case. In
the latter case, the union bargained as exclusive representative with
the railroad for a collective agreement which was discriminatory on its
face and in operation.12 In the Conley case there was no such dis-
* 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
* "[T]he right asserted, which is derived from the duty imposed by the statute
on the bargaining representative, is a federal right implied from the statute and
the policy which it has adopted. It is the federal statute which condemns as un-
lawful the Brotherhood's conduct! ' Id. at 204.
" In deciding a companion case, Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944), the Court merely adopted the reasoning
of the Steele case, holding that the right asserted by plaintiffs is derived from the
duty imposed by the Railway Labor Act on the union as exclusive bargaining
representative. Upon remand of the Tunstall case, petitioners recovered in the
district court. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Tunstall,
69 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1946), aff'd, 163 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 841 (1947).11323 U.S. at 203.
2 Unions may negotiate collective bargaining agreements which are discrim-
inatory in some respects, but such discriminations must not be based on color.
Such contracts may have unfavorable effects on some members of the craft repre-
sented provided such differences are relevant to authorized purposes of the act,
such as differences in seniority, type of work performed, and the competence and
skill with which it is performed. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203
(1944). Much litigation has arisen where returning war veterans have been given
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criminatory contract; rather, it was administered in a discriminatory
manner. Secondly, in the Steele case the Negro petitioners were ex-
cluded entirely from membership in the union, while in the Conley
case they were union members, though segregated into a separate local.
In reaching a decision on the sufficiency of the complaint in the
Steele case the Court had to pass upon several jurisdictional problems
which apply equally to the situation in the Conley case. The most
important of these was that under the Railway Labor Act aggrieved
employees could file their own grievances with the National Railroad
Adjustment Board. 13 But, the Court pointed out that the Board has
consistently declined in over four hundred cases to hear grievance com-
plaints by individual members of a craft represented by a union. 14 "The
only way that an individual may prevail is by taking his case to the
union and causing the union to carry it through to the Board."15
Therefore, said the Court, there is -no administrative remedy available
which would be a condition precedent to equitable relief.10
During the next few years after Steele was decided, its doctrine was
supported in other cases with almost identical facts.17 The doctrine
higher seniority ratings than others who had worked for the company for some
time. See Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. 330 (1953) ; Hartley v. Brother-
hood of Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938).
"The Court also disposed of the following contentions: (1) The question was
not one of a jujrisdictional dispute determinable under the administrative scheme
set up by the act. Cf. Switchman's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S.
297 (1943). (2) The question was not restricted by the act to voluntary settle-
ment by recourse to the traditional implements of mediation, conciliation, and
arbitration. Cf. General Comm. of Adjustment of Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943). (3) No question of who
was entitled to represent the craft or who were members of it was involved, issues
which would have been relegated for settlement to the Mediation Board. Cf.
Switchman's Union v. National Mediation Bd., supra. (4) There was no difficulty
as to the interpretation of the contract which by the act is committed to the juris-
diction of the Railroad Adjustment Board.
' dntinirtrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc No. 10, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1941).15Ibid.
"It is fairly obvious why the Court would not want to limit petitioners to an
action before the Board even if it found that the Board had jurisdiction in such
cases. The Board's members are chosen by groups of carriers and the large
national unions. 48 STAT. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First (a), (b), (c),(g) (1952). There are few procedural safeguards. There is no process for com-
pelling the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence, and no official
record is kept except the informal pleadings. Hearings are conducted without wit-
nesses. Adiiiinistrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11-14 (1941). Finally, the statute provides no relief for a peti-
tioning party-be he individual, union, or carrier-against an erroneous order of
the Board. 48 STAT. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First (in), (p) (1952).
" Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U.S.
232 (1949). In this case the Court held specifically that the anti-injunction pro-
visions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 20 U.S.C. §§ 101-15(1952), do not prohibit injunctions of the type which petitioners sought. "In Vir-
ginian R. Co. v. System Federation ... we held that the Norris-La Guardia Act
did not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to compel compliance with positive
[Vol. 36
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was somewhat extended in Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v.
Howard.18 There, the Negroes discriminated against.were not within
the class of workers which the union had a statutory duty to represent,
i.e., they were not within the bargaining unit. The Negroes filed a
complaint similar to that in the Steele case. The union's contention
was that the act imposed no duty upon them. to bargain collectively for
persons not in their craft or class and that they had no statutory duty
to refrain from discriminating against persons whom they had no
duty to represent. The Court held that this was not a significant dis-
tinction. The case therefore means that unions protected by the act
must not use their power to negotiate collective bargaining agreements
which discriminate on the grounds of race or color regardless of the
classification of the victims. 19
It will be observed that a common feature of every case considered
thus far prior to Conley is that the unions had negotiated through collec-
tive bargaining a clause in a collective bargaining agreement which
was discriminatory on its face. It was after the decision in the
Howard case that those unions desiring to discriminate against Negro
mandates of the Railway Labor Act . . .enacted for the benefit and protection,
within a particular field, of the same groups whose rights are preserved by the
Norris-La Guardia Act. To depart from those views would be to strike from
labor's hands the sole judicial weapon it may employ to enforce such minority
rights as these petitioners assert and which we have held are now secured to them
by federal statute. To hold that this Act deprives labor of means of enforcing
bargaining rights specifically accorded by the Railway Labor Act would indeed be
to 'turn the blade inward."' Id. at 237. See also, Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line
R..t, 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); Mitchell v. Gulf, M., & 0. R.R., 91 F. Supp.
175 (N.D. Ala. 1950). For later decisions see Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
v. Mitchell, 190 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Central of Ga. R.R. v. Jones, 229 F.2d
648 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
18343 U.S. 768 (1952).
'o Despite the fact that the case is so regarded, the Negro "train porters" were
only nominally in a different craft or class from the white employees. The bar-
gaining unit was made up of white brakemen. It is true that the company and
the union had always considered the Negroes as members of a different class
from the white brakemen for collective bargaining purposes and that' the Negroes
had been represented for bargaining by a separate union of their own choosing
but, in addition to performing the same duties as regular white brakemen, they
spent only about five percent of their time sweeping aisles and helping patrons on
and off trains. Thus, they were in reality brakemen.
The comments of Justice Minton, with whom Chief Justice Vinson and Justice
Reed joined in dissenting, are of interest: "The majority reaches out to invalidate
the contract, not because the train porters are brakemen entitled to fair representa-
tion by the Brotherhood, but because they are Negroes who were discriminated
against by the carrier at the behest of the Brotherhood. I do not understand
that private parties may not discriminate on the ground of race. Neither a state
government nor the Federal Government may do so, but I know of no applicable
federal law which says that private parties may not. That is the whole problem
underlying the proposed Federal Fair Employment Practices Code. Of course,
this court by sheer power can say this case is Steele, or even lay down a code of
fair employment practices. But sheer power is not a substitute for legality. I do
not have to agree with the discrimination here indulged in to question the legality
of today's decision." Id. at 777.
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workers became more subtle in their approach. This subtlety led to a
serious conflict among the circuits.
Petitioners' complaint in Hayes v. Union Pac. R.R.2 0 did not allege,
either directly or indirectly, that the collective bargaining agreement by
its terms provided for discrimination against petitioners. But petitioners
did allege that the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with an undisclosed intention of administering it in a discriminatory
manner. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
stating that it was clear that the federal courts are not charged with the
duty of policing the parties in the performance of collective bargaining
agreements entered into pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, pointing out that the National
Railroad Adjustment Board bad been established to afford relief for the
breach of collective bargaining agreements.21 "It is only when collective
bargaining agreements are unlawfully entered into or when the agree-
ments themselves are unlawful in terms or effect, that the federal courts
may act."22  The Third23 and Fifth2 4 Circuits quickly fell into line.
20 184 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 942 (1951).21 The court cited the Railway Labor Act; Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R.,
339 U.S. 239 (1950); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946).2 Hayes v. Union Pac. R.R., 184 F.2d 337, 338 (9th Cir. 1950).
3 Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. dcnied, 346
U.S. 840 (1953). In this case we are dealing not with the Railway Labor Act
but with the National Labor Relations Act. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1952). There would seem to be no reason why the doctrine
as enunciated in the line of railway cases from Steele to Conley would not pervade
the entire field of labor, embracing those unions and employers covered by the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. As under the Railway Labor Act,
the majority of the employees is entitled to select the exclusive collective bar-
gaining representative whose statutory duty it becomes upon certification to repre-
sent not only the majority but all of the employees in the bargaining unit. Hughes
Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953) ; Larus and Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075
(1945). The minority of employees is not entitled to select a collective bargaining
representative of its own, and the company is not allowed to treat with such a
representative.
There has been almost no litigation involving this question outside of the
railway field. However, the Supreme Court apparently agrees with the above
conclusion in the one case in point which it has decided. In Syres v. Oil Workers
Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), the Court reversed in a per curiam decisi6n,
which cited only the Steele, Tunstall, and Howard cases, a court of appeals
decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Syres v. Oil
Workers Int'l Union, Local 23, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955). In this case a Negro
local and a white local of the Oil Workers were certified as joint bargaining
representatives in a single unit. The two locals "amalgamated," forming a single
bargaining committee with an agreement that there should be but one line of
seniority. The committee, which was all white, made a contract providing for
tvo lines of seniority. The effect was to freeze the Negroes in their jobs. The
court of appeals, following Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, attempted to dis-
tinguish the Steele case, pointing out that here the petitioners were actually
members of the union whereas there plaintiffs were not union members and were
excluded from membership. The Supreme Court obviously did not feel that this
was a sufficient distinction. The court of appeals had pointed out in its opinion
that no administrative remedr was available from the National Labor Relations
Board.
A unique feature of the Williams case was that the Negro petitioners were
[Vol. 36
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The lines of conflict were clearly drawn, however, when the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided Dillard v. Chesapeake &
0. R.R.25 There, petitioners were Negroes who had been working as
machinists' helpers and laborers, jobs requiring little skill. Some of
these workers were not represented by a labor union. All of the more
skilled crafts, however, were represented by unions which had negotiated
collective bargaining agreements with the company. These contracts
set up uniform rules for the promotion of company employees from one
class to another and within a class and were not discriminatory on their
face. The plaintiffs charged that the company, pursuant to union pres-
sure and solely on the ground of race, failed to promote them according
to the uniform rules. They alleged that they had been qualified,
eligible, and entitled for years to be upgraded to higher job classifica-
tions, but that instead white employees with less seniority and no more
competence were promoted ahead of them.
The court specifically indicated its disapproval of the decision of the
Ninth Circuit in the Hayes case. Speaking for the court, the late
Judge John J. Parker said, "It is immaterial that the unions in exert-
ing their power to discriminate against the Negro employees did not do
so by entering into a formal bargaining contract. It is the unlawful use
of power vested in the unions by the Railway Labor Act which gives
rise to the jurisdiction of the court to afford relief, not the particular
form which such abuse of power takes." 26  The court concluded that
it is just as unlawful to use the power of the bargaining organization
to prevent advancement of Negroes as .to use it to destroy their jobs.
Since some of the employees were not represented by the union, this
case is an extension of both the Howard and Steele cases.
This was followed by interesting developments in the Fifth Circuit
when the principal case of Conley v. Gibson arose. The district judge
actually members of the union. Petitioners were also members of the union in
the Hayes case, but the Ninth Circuit did not discuss that point at length. In
the Williams case the court held this to be a matter of some weight, pointing
out that the taxicab drivers' union derived its authority to bargain for petitioners
from their own consent and not from section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952), which declares that the
collective bargaining representative selected by a majority of the employees in the
unit is the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees therein. On this
basis no federal question was involved. The Supreme Court reviewed none of
these cases. The Court has since held, however, that the mere fact that petitioners
are members of the union is not a sufficient distinction; that a federal question is
still involved. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) ; Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
- Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 189 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1951). Airlines
are covered by the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. 49 STAT. 1189 (1936),
45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1952). See also Hampton v. Thompson, 171 F.2d 535 (5th
Cir. 1948).
2l199 F.2d 948 (4th Cir., 1952).
2 Id. at 951.
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dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint,27 and the circuit court affirmed in a
per curiam opinion.28  The Supreme Court granted certiorari." While
Conley v. Gibson was pending before the Supreme Court, the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed itself in the case of Richardson v. Texas & N.O. R.R. 0
Here, the white and Negro workers had become segregated into two
groups, and by custom the Negroes had been discriminated against as
far as seniority was concerned. There was a contract clause, non-
discriminatory on its face, which merely stated that the current method
of assigning crews was satisfactory and that no change would be made
during the life of the contract. In holding that the union must not
discriminate in collective bargaining on the grounds of race the court
said, "Any other rule would permit a bargaining union and its railroad-
employer to practice or perpetliate jointly, through custom and under
an agreement innocuous in terms, that very abuse of the bargaining
representative's power of representation directly proscribed by the
Steele and Tunstall decisions."3 1
What then is and will be the effect of the Supreme Court's decision
in Conley v. Gibson? It resolves the conflict which had developed among
the circuits by specifically overruling the Hayes case from the Ninth
Circuit, and by following in effect the holdings of the Fourth Circuit
in the Dillard case and of the Fifth Circuit in the Richardson case.
This means that a union breaches its statutory duty imposed by the
Railway Labor Act when it uses its power derived from the act to dis-
criminate against a group of minority workers on the grounds of race
and color whether or not they be within the class of employees for
which the union has a statutory duty to bargain and whether or not
the union negotiates a collective bargaining agreement with an employer
which is discriminatory on its face. All discriminatory action on the
part of labor unions which is based on race or color alone is forbidden.
But the case goes further than this. In the complaint petitioners
did not allege that the union procured their discharge. They rather
alleged that the union "according to plan" failed to represent them in
collective bargaining and to process their grievances as they would have
for a white employee discharged in a similar manner. It would seem that
the Court is not only'forbidding the union from taking discriminatory
action against any employees but is requiring the union to represent
all employees affirmatively and without discrimination in all respects, in-
cluding representation against unilateral discriminatory action of the
employer3 2  THOMAS W. WARLICK
2'138 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Tex. 1955). 28229 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1956).
"352 U.S. 818 (1957). 20242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957).
,1 Id. at 234.
"Some states have gone much further in their holdings on this subject than
have the federal courts. Generally, there has been no attempt by the states to
[Vol. 36
